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Since his first book, David Schmidtz has combined great freshness and clarity of writing with original 
and sophisticated theory.  The Elements of Justice continues the tradition he has established for himself.   
From Schmidtz, one might expect a theory of justice, basically along libertarian lines.  The 
book may surprise, though not disappoint, for that is not quite what one would find.  Instead, the title 
is apt.  Schmidtz says that there is a terrain of justice, the terrain of what people are due, and it has a 
certain kind of unity:  
 
What we call justice is a constellation of somewhat related elements.  I see a 
degree of integration and unity, but the integrity of justice is limited, more like the 
integrity of a neighborhood than of a building.  A good neighborhood is 
functional, a place where people can live well.  (p.  3) 
 
Justice, too, is functional, a neighborhood in which people can live well together.  What 
Schmidtz offers are the pieces, the elements, that comprise the neighborhood of justice.  There are 
separate analyses, explorations, investigations—which may or may not add up to a unified theory.  We 
have the elements, not necessarily the full pattern into which they fit.   
That may seem unsatisfying, but Schmidtz very attractively makes a virtue of it.  The root idea 
is that a theory is a map of some terrain.  Some maps are better than others, and even for the same 
terrain, the best map for one person’s purposes may not be so useful for another’s.  We do not all have 
the same purposes or the same problems to solve, so we do not all need the same map.  Maybe we will 
have different partial maps.  Maybe our maps will highlight different features.  And maybe they will 
be none the worse for that.   
A theory of justice is an attempt to map the terrain, the neighborhood, of justice.  Of course, it 
concerns what people are due.  But what is that?  There is not going to be just one answer.  There are 
different problems, different situations, where we wonder what people are due.  It makes sense that 
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sometimes one consideration, sometimes another, will determine the answer. 
Schmidtz presents some of the different considerations that belong on the map.  He thinks they 
fit together, more or less.  However, he does not think that some one among them is the most basic, so 
that each of the rest must either be reduced to it or else discarded.  Nor does he claim that these are all 
the elements of justice.  Perhaps there are more.  Or less: perhaps our maps do not carve the nature of 
justice at its joints; there might be more illuminating ways to count and classify the elements we have. 
The elements to which Schmidtz directs his attention are desert, reciprocity, equality, and 
need—elements which themselves turn out to incorporate complexity, with “at least two kinds of 
deserving, three ways of responding to favors, and two dimensions of equality, plus a complex 
hierarchy of needs.” (pp. 27-8)  For each element, he engages in sharp analysis and often finds the 
unexpected.  He has a knack for examining what everyone else takes for granted and finding it to be 
less than obvious.   
The complexity, and the focus upon elements as much as or more than upon overall patterns, 
makes summary difficult.  Instead, to communicate something of the flavor of the book, two examples 
will be presented, and something will be added about the concluding section on Rawls and Nozick. 
An example of Schmidtz’s approach, and of the surprising things it may turn up, can be found 
in his treatment of the commonplace that a person cannot deserve her native endowments or the 
circumstances into which she was fortunate to be born.  He asks whether that is really so, and answers 
that it is not.  When we talk about desert, there is an implicit appeal to some kind of appropriate balance.  
On one side, there is what is deserved; on the other, there is the person’s input, what she does to deserve 
it.  In the case of rewards and punishments, the input has to come first.  That is why it seems natural to 
suppose that such advantages as native endowments cannot be deserved.  There is nothing the person 
could have done first.  However, Schmidtz suggests, this is the product of a hasty over-generalization.  
Rewards and punishments do not provide the only cases in which we think people deserve something.  
We also have the notion of people who deserve a chance or an opportunity.  How do we know they 
deserved it?  By what they do with it after they get it.  What they do may show they deserved it.  She 
who deserves a chance may make full use of it, once she gets it.  Thus, it is not necessary to earn or 
deserve advantages before getting them in order to genuinely deserve them.  For an advantage or 
benefit to be deserved, the equation must be balanced, but the balancing input does not necessarily 
have to be supplied in advance.  And if we have been fortunate in our native endowments or 
circumstances, we may still put them to good use and thus show that we deserved them.   
For another example, Schmidtz considers the widely accepted argument—accepted even by 
Nobel-Prize-winning economists, as he points out—that the diminishing marginal utility of wealth 
provides a reason for equalizing its distribution.  The idea is that if the wealthy would get less utility 
from a given unit of wealth than the poor, then, in principle, total utility could be increased by 
transferring that unit from the wealthy to the poor.  Of course, “in principle” covers many 
complications in practice, including incentive effects and the costs of arranging the transfer.  The 
complications may entirely swamp any rationale for the transfer.  But Schmidtz focuses on a pure and 
uncomplicated case to make the point that the argument omits production.  In a world in which 
production is possible, it may be important for assets to be controlled by those who get less utility from 
them and who would therefore rather invest than consume them.  Since assets invested in production 
can yield greater future utility, overall utility may be promoted by not making the transfer—even when 
complications are absent.  Production can make a difference, and production is not a mere complication 
that can legitimately be assumed away, if we wish our theorizing to be relevant to the real world.  This 
is not, and Schmidtz does not suppose that it is, an argument against all redistribution, but it is an 
important reminder that equalizing wealth, even in the simple and pure case, is not necessarily utility-
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maximizing. 
These are typical of the many justice-related issues that Schmidtz examines.  The book is filled 
with surprising claims, fresh analyses, new perspectives and interesting arguments.  In the final part, 
we have something a bit different, but no less fresh or original.  The section could be described as a 
tribute to the work of Rawls and Nozick, but not in the sense of uncritically praising their work or 
defending their positions.  It hardly could be, given their disagreements with each other.  Instead, 
Schmidtz recognizes their work as framing “the landscape of political philosophy in the last decades 
of the twentieth century,” (Charles Fried, quoted on p.  3) and he subjects some of their central positions 
to examination which is both critical and sympathetic.  Reading Schmidtz’s treatment reminds us not 
only of where Nozick and Rawls differed but also of how much they had in common, especially in 
their concern to recognize the separateness of persons and to embody that recognition in their political 
philosophies. 
Much more could be said about this fine book; much more needs to be said about its various 
parts.  Though it defies easy summary, it is filled with interesting argument and, over and over, 
provokes questioning, insight, further thought, and, sometimes, disagreement.  Spending time with it, 
whether one agrees or disagrees—or, more likely, does both in part—is bound to be intellectually 
rewarding.  That, it may be suspected, is what Schmidtz most wants us to take from it. 
